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INTRODUCTION 
The term infringe means “to act in a way that is against a law or that 
limits someone’s rights or freedom.”1 Pervasive within the three major 
codified areas of intellectual property (IP) law—copyright, patent, and 
trademark—is this concept of infringement, which dovetails with Professor 
Anita Bernstein’s thesis that the common law can support feminist legal 
progress through its protection of negative liberty—the right to say no to 
what one does not want.2 Indeed, IP law is deeply rooted in the common law 
 
 * Donald & Lynda Horowitz Professor for the Pursuit of Justice, Seattle University School of Law. 
Many thanks to Professor Bridget Crawford for organizing this online Symposium, to Professors Lydia 
Loren and Zahr Said for their thoughts on a half-baked idea, to Professor Jessica Silbey for her insightful 
comments on a more-fully baked expression, as well as to Jenny Wu (class of 2021) for her timely 
research support. I also acknowledge the tremendous intellectual encouragement, inspiration, and support 
provided to feminist IP scholars through the IP/Gender Series, hosted by the Program on Information 
Justice and Intellectual Property at American University Washington College of Law. Any errors are 
mine. 
 1 Infringe, CAMBRIDGE ACAD. CONTENT DICTIONARY, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/infringe [https://perma.cc/D56E-M32A] 
(emphasis added). 
 2 ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 15 (2019) (“Negative liberty 
says that boundary-crossing into the personal identity and space of a person qua person is wrong. 
Common law doctrines enlist the state to enforce this entitlement.”); id. at 8 (“To hold negative liberty . . . 
is to enjoy . . . ‘condoned self-regard.’ We may put ourselves first, in other words. Individuals may favor 
themselves and what they think are their own interests over the demands that another person makes.”). 
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of tort as well as property.3 Both tort and property law regulate relationships 
among competing interests, but tort law arguably conveys more directly than 
does property law the sense of mutual obligations within communities 
through its element of duty. 
Profoundly shaped by these common law kinships, the statutory grants 
of IP’s exclusive rights encourage a person to engage in her creative and 
inventive pursuits (or, in the case of trademark law, to pursue legitimate 
competition with others). Relatedly, a negative liberty associated with a 
finding of infringement is a freedom by the IP holder from wrongful takings 
of chattels (albeit intangible ones).4 The view that infringers harm IP holders 
in their rightful enjoyment of the fruits of IP is evident, for example, in the 
ongoing debate over whether or not the sampling of sound recordings 
requires permission from a copyright owner of the music being sampled.5 
Such alleged infringers might also commit incursions upon the dignity or 
tranquility of the IP holder, or impose an agenda that the IP holder does not 
share—two other “Do Not Wants” that Bernstein claims as protective 
functions of the common law. 
In these scenarios, IP provides a boundary against the offensive act, 
which is legally represented by a finding of infringement. Consider a nude 
selfie posted online without authorization of the photographer. As the 
copyright holder of the photograph, the photographer can wield the sword of 
her exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, or to publicly display this work.6 
In turn, the alleged infringer must, to use Bernstein’s words, “heed[] and 
honor[] [the copyright holder’s] objections, resistances, and protests.”7 
Nonetheless and not surprisingly, many IP feminist scholars perceive a 
disparity between the gender-neutral facial equality of IP and its unequal 
application and impact by gender.8 Nude selfies, for instance, create harms 
that fall disproportionately upon female authors rather than male authors as 
 
 3 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual 
Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1544–45 (2010). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1962) (creating federal civil action for trademark infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 501 
(2006) (creating federal civil action for copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (creating federal 
civil action for patent infringement). 
 5 See, e.g., VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 6 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 7 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 35. 
 8 See generally Kara W. Swanson, Intellectual Property and Gender: Reflections on 
Accomplishments and Methodology, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 175, 183–86 (2015) 
(surveying the gender disparities, exclusions, and biases experienced by female inventors and scholars in 
traditional IP law). 
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targets of so-called nonconsensual pornography.9 Moving beyond examples 
of misuse of specific kinds of IP-protected products to the distribution of the 
economic rewards of IP, recent statistics show the relative lack of female 
representation in the upper echelons of the copyright content industries.10 
Furthermore, this issue of gender-based inequality is compounded by 
new harms that confront us in an era of information overload rather than 
information scarcity. Do consumers have the right to say no to intrusive 
advertising or to the lack of information about supply chain governance? Do 
online users have the right to say no to ubiquitous data gathering on their 
searches and other activity? Do targets have the right to say no to online 
harassment of a highly sexualized, threatening, and often anonymous nature, 
in response to posting of content? These informational transgressions—
arguably types of infringement—threaten the dignity or tranquility of 
individuals. And yet these often-gendered harms remain largely unaddressed 
by the law, including IP law. If IP is a species of a larger genus of information 
law,11 then ought not it recognize and respond to these informational harms? 
Bernstein’s argument may offer some useful tools to answer these emerging 
questions. In particular, the twin grounds of condoned self-regard and 
negative liberty may help bridge the distance between formal and substantive 
gender equality within IP, by affirming the importance of personal 
boundaries and control in achieving optimal human development.12 
 
 9 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 100–02 (2014), cited in Margaret Chon, 
Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364, 369 (2016). 
 10 MARTHA M. LAUZEN, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF WOMEN IN TELEVISION & FILM, SAN DIEGO STATE 
UNIV., THE CELLULOID CEILING: BEHIND-THE-SCENES EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN ON THE TOP 100, 250, 
AND 500 FILMS OF 2018 (2019), https://womenintvfilm.sdsu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/2018_Celluloid_Ceiling_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ELN-KKCN] 
(summarizing the proportion of female directors, writers, producers, etc. in the 250 highest-grossing U.S. 
films in 2018); STACY L. SMITH, MARC CHOUEITI & KATHERINE PIEPER, USC ANNENBERG INCLUSION 
INITIATIVE, INCLUSION IN THE RECORDING STUDIO? GENDER AND RACE/ETHNICITY OF ARTISTS, 
SONGWRITERS & PRODUCERS ACROSS 700 POPULAR SONGS FROM 2012–2018 (2019), 
http://assets.uscannenberg.org/docs/aii-inclusion-recording-studio-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8S5-
8UZJ] (detailing the percentage of female artists and producers in the music industry compared to men 
from 2012–2018). 
 11 Peter Goodrich, Sonia K. Kayal & Rebecca Tushnet, Panel I: Critical Legal Studies in Intellectual 
Property and Information Law Scholarship, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 611 (2013) (“This way 
of reconceiving the notion of public progress has really been influenced by the structural critiques that 
were offered by Lawrence Lessig, Siva Vaidhyanathan, and Jessica Litman, who gave birth to a critical 
information studies movement that was really focused on critiquing the structural relationship between 
broad flows of information and the danger of overbroad property rights.”). 
 12 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 97 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, an early proponent of recognizing 
the boundary-respecting values of IP, who stated that “to achieve proper self-development—to be 
a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment”) (Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev.957 (1982)). 
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However, IP presents some unique challenges to Bernstein’s thesis. The 
first challenge stems from IP’s concern with the negative liberty of not only 
the IP holder but also the putative infringer. This is evident, for example, in 
copyright’s fair use doctrine. A second challenge stems from IP’s primary 
focus on commercial harm rather than individual harm. Bernstein’s 
arguments tend to focus more on injuries to a woman’s dignity or privacy 
interests, than to her potential markets. Thus, they may fall short of 
addressing the structural inequality and social justice issues located within 
IP, which often de-emphasizes noneconomic injuries. Nonetheless, 
Bernstein’s arguments also suggest ways in which IP could adjust its 
priorities so as to treat harms to individuals (for example, dignity-based 
harms) with the same gravitas that it treats business torts. Each of these two 
challenges is explored below, with a focus on copyright law. 
I. CHALLENGE ONE: WHOSE NEGATIVE LIBERTY MATTERS? 
Copyright law is heavily statutory, yet simultaneously provides more 
than a palimpsest of common law influence and activity. For example, 
common law principles actively shape copyright’s secondary liability 
doctrine: Faced with rapidly emerging challenges associated with networked 
digital technologies, courts have innovated within the interstices of statutory 
text.13 And the current U.S. statutory framework, the 1976 Copyright Act, 
codifies a key doctrine that originated as a common law rule of reason: fair 
use.14 Fair use defines the contours of use of copyrighted material without 
payment to or permission by the copyright holder.15 A judicial finding of fair 
use is equivalent to a finding of noninfringement, and it thus operates as a 
safety valve against the overextension of the rights associated with 
copyright. Courts constantly manage the boundary between transgressive 
and nontransgressive (infringing and noninfringing) creative activity through 
fair use and other doctrines that may excuse or otherwise limit liability—so-
called exceptions and limitations. Furthermore, the statutory interpretation 
of the fair use doctrine itself is open-ended and constantly subject to judicial 
 
 13 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) 
(articulating an inducement theory of secondary liability, derived from both patent law and common law). 
 14 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: 
Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane 
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
 15 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN 
COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 2018). 
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extension and elaboration.16 Courts have not been timid to expound upon fair 
use and other copyright doctrines, whether substantively or procedurally.17 
This means that the copyright holder’s sword against any potential 
infringer is not absolute but rather, may be subject to an analysis that 
accounts for the benefits and burdens faced by both parties. For instance, 
let’s say a mother captures a video of her toddler dancing with delight to 
music recorded by a famous musician. After the mother posts the video 
online, the recording label (which holds copyright in the sound recording) 
issues a take-down notice to the intermediary providing the platform for 
online content. The copyright holder—the record label—may be required to 
undergo a fair use assessment before issuing this notice, at the risk of a 
judicial finding of misrepresentation should it fail to do so.18 
This example illustrates that courts have developed the negative liberty 
enjoyed by the copyright holder into perhaps something more malleable than 
the liberty enjoyed by the common law’s quintessential chattel-holder. If 
“possession, understood to cover things and land together, dominates the 
entire human sense of what is right and wrong,”19 then who is the rightful 
possessor of cultural content,20 critique,21 experience,22 and/or play?23 Fair use 
encompasses the answers to these questions in IP because it accounts for 
possessory harms to those other than the copyright holder. Possession of 
chunks of shared knowledge and information will shift, depending on the 
position of the party as subject or object, creator or consumer, originator or 
follow-on innovator, or even victim or perpetrator. Fair use is one, albeit 
 
 16 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (favoring a use that “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message; [a court] asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative’”). 
 17 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Lydia Pallas 
Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 688 (2015)). 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012) (“Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents . . . that material 
or activity is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages . . . incurred by the alleged infringer . . . .”). 
 19 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 50 (citing to PHILIPPE ROCHAT, ORIGINS OF POSSESSION: OWNING 
AND SHARING IN DEVELOPMENT 4 (2014)). 
 20 See generally Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 
14 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 551 (2006) (critiquing copyright doctrine generally from a 
feminist perspective). 
 21 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273 (2007) (analyzing the fair use doctrine from a feminist perspective). 
 22 Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience, 117 MICH. L. REV. 197, 235 (2018) 
(discussing experience and experimentation in child development). 
 23 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012) (discussing the critical importance of play in human development). 
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incomplete, mechanism to address dignity and equality values represented 
by a putative infringer within IP.24 
Thus, IP law’s protection of intangible chattels resulting from creative 
and inventive activity transcends the categorical duality of possession. 
Claims to chattel may shift from one party to the other, depending upon 
context and circumstance. In this way, IP law incorporates the negative 
liberty of the putative infringer along with that of the IP owner, and does not 
necessarily give absolute primacy to the latter. 
II. CHALLENGE TWO: COMMERCIAL V. DIGNITARY HARM 
The dominant view of IP frames its instrumental purpose of fostering 
innovation almost exclusively through the robustness of market-driven 
outcomes rather than other possible alternative metrics.25 If IP rights are 
primarily commercial rights, then it follows that IP does not necessarily 
recognize harms other than market-based harms.26 But even accepting the 
dominance of the market rationale, IP’s relationship to equitable market 
participation is problematic. For example, it currently results in the exclusion 
of women from much of the economic fruits of creative and inventive 
activity.27 In addition to this problematic distribution of IP’s economic 
benefits, the overly-narrow view of IP as a set of commercial rights negates 
the intertwined history of common law privacy and statutory publication in 
 
 24 See generally JESSICA SILBEY, AGAINST PROGRESS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE INTERNET AGE (forthcoming 2020) (synopsis on file with author) 
(“Equality, privacy, and distributive justice are central to human dignity but have been largely absent 
from intellectual property policy. This book for the first time describes these debates about intellectual 
property as a bellwether of changing social justice needs in the digital age.”). 
 25 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been 
Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549 (2015) (arguing that nonmarket-based harms are irrelevant to IP). But 
see Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295280 [https://perma.cc/NH99-299T] (arguing that IP should not be 
constrained in expressing harms in market language). 
 26 Cf. Lateef Mtima, The Idea Exclusions in Intellectual Property Law, TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2020) (on file with author). See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (exploring various market-related theories of intellectual property). 
 27 See, e.g., LAUZEN, supra note 10, at 1–3 (reporting that in 2018, women comprised 20% of all 
directors, writers, producers, executive producers, editors, and cinematographers working on the top 250 
domestic gross films; specifically, women comprised 8% of directors, 16% of writers, 21% of executive 
producers and 6% of composers working on the top 250 films in 2018, and 73% of those films had no 
women writers at all); SMITH, CHOUEITI & PIEPER, supra note 10 (documenting that in 2018, women 
comprised only 17.1% of 2018 Billboard Hot 100 artists; 12.2% of credited songwriters; 2.3% of music 
producers; and, from 2013–2018, 10.4% of Grammy nominees ). 
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copyright law,28 not to mention the various intersectional approaches of IP 
more broadly within torts-like human rights regimes.29 By contrast, much of 
what is protectible by copyright is not intended to be monetized, but rather 
to contribute to self-actualization and/or the nurturing of sociality to the end 
of human flourishing.30 Numerous IP scholars have critiqued the 
anachronistic view that all authors and inventors care about is 
remuneration.31 Even the U.S. Copyright Office recently departed from its 
usual focus on economic rights with a report emphasizing moral rights such 
as attribution.32 
IP’s current orientation flies in the face of much of Bernstein’s faith in 
the common law as an instrument for progressive social change, specifically 
in the direction of gender equality. True, her dazzling tour de force ends with 
an incantation of the wealth of nations, and thus, she clearly endorses market-
based choices made by individuals (if and only if they can protect themselves 
through the common law’s full endorsement of their negative liberties).33 But 
the majority of her thesis lies outside the realm of commerce and literally 
inside the female body (i.e., penetration and pregnancy). This is 
unnecessarily limiting to her broader liberating claims for common law. 
Relatedly, a market rationale should not be the only framework for a legal 
regime designed to promote overall social welfare through creative and 
inventive activity. Bernstein’s framework can bring into focus the full range 
of IP’s negative liberties, which include the freedom not to experience 
dignitary harms, including but not limited to those associated with being 
excluded from its economic benefits. 
 
 28 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1985) (“It is true that 
common-law copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy . . . . In its commercial guise, 
however, an author’s right to choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protection.”). 
 29 See, e.g., DUNCAN MATTHEWS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: 
THE ROLE OF NGOS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2011). 
 30 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 
2909–10 (2006). 
 31 See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015); COHEN, supra note 23; Mtima, supra note 26; Sunder, supra note 22, 
at 197. 
 32 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (2019); see also ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: 
FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010); Cathay Y. N. Smith, Creative 
Destruction: Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine and the Moral Right of Integrity, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367075 [https://perma.cc/UX64-8VAK]. 
 33 BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 213–14 (referring to ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(1776)); id. at 198 (discussing the law governing the sale of female body parts). 




Professor Bernstein’s pursuit of condoned self-regard and negative 
liberty provides important signposts to common law priorities as it engages 
with the regulation of information and knowledge. This Essay points to how 
her overall framework can help us to understand IP as a mechanism for 
addressing potential harms not just to the IP owner, but also to the putative 
infringer. It also highlights that Bernstein’s emphasis on dignitary harms can 
inform IP, just as IP’s emphasis on economic harms can inform her thesis. 
However, as stated at the outset, the statutory scarcities created by the 
exclusive rights of IP are responding to a problem that is obsolescing in the 
face of informational nonscarcity—indeed, in conditions of informational 
overload.34 Perhaps the common law within IP can recognize the newer 
challenges of information—those created by ubiquitous information and 
communication technologies—by applying Bernstein’s principles to protect 
women’s various interests as they engage with technologies of information 
and communications. Common law principles point to the recognition of 
emergent harms, such as cyber harassment, that now permeate our media 
landscapes, while at the same time pay due regard to free expression and 
healthy market competition.35 In that regard, the common law might also help 
to pivot IP away from its solipsistic gaze on incentives for innovation in the 
pursuit of economic growth toward a more expansive frame based upon the 
primacy of human flourishing, including, but not limited, to female bodies. 
 
 34 See generally Guy Pessach, Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP 
Era, 54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 225 (2016) (discussing proprietary IP and capitalist structures of corporate 
media). 
 35 CITRON, supra note 9, at 190; see also THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND 
REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (describing emerging legal issues 
relevant to the Internet age). 
